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Abstract—Due to the increasing usage of machine learning
(ML) techniques in security- and safety-critical domains, such
as autonomous systems and medical diagnosis, ensuring correct
behavior of ML systems, especially for different corner cases,
is of growing importance. In this paper, we propose a generic
framework for evaluating security and robustness of ML systems
using different real-world safety properties. We further design,
implement and evaluate VERIVIS, a scalable methodology that
can verify a diverse set of safety properties for state-of-the-art
computer vision systems with only blackbox access. VERIVIS
leverage different input space reduction techniques for efficient
verification of different safety properties. VERIVIS is able to find
thousands of safety violations in fifteen state-of-the-art computer
vision systems including ten Deep Neural Networks (DNNs)
such as Inception-v3 and Nvidia’s Dave self-driving system with
thousands of neurons as well as five commercial third-party vision
APIs including Google vision and Clarifai for twelve different
safety properties. Furthermore, VERIVIS can successfully verify
local safety properties, on average, for around 31.7% of the test
images. VERIVIS finds up to 64.8× more violations than existing
gradient-based methods that, unlike VERIVIS, cannot ensure
non-existence of any violations. Finally, we show that retraining
using the safety violations detected by VERIVIS can reduce the
average number of violations up to 60.2%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in Machine Learning (ML) techniques
like Deep Learning (DL) have resulted in an impressive
performance boost for a broad spectrum of complex, real-
world tasks including object recognition, image segmentation,
and speech recognition. ML systems are increasingly getting
deployed in security- and safety-critical domains such as self-
driving cars [7], automated passenger screening [31], and
medical diagnosis [19]. Several such systems have already
either achieved or surpassed human-level performance on
curated test sets.
However, security- and safety-critical systems, besides cor-
rectly handling the common cases, must also demonstrate
correct behavior for rare corner cases. Despite their significant
progress, machine learning systems often make dangerous
and even potentially fatal mistakes. For example, a Tesla
autonomous car was recently involved in a fatal crash that
resulted from the system’s failure to detect a white truck
against a bright sky with white clouds [2]. Such incidents
demonstrate the need for rigorous testing and verification of
ML systems under different settings (e.g., different lighting
conditions for self-driving cars) to ensure the security and
safety of ML systems.
Most existing testing methods for ML systems involve mea-
suring the accuracy and loss using manually-labeled randomly-
chosen test samples [52]. Unfortunately, similar to traditional
software, such random testing approaches are not effective at
finding erroneous corner-case behaviors [37], [46]. Moreover,
unlike traditional software, the ML decision logic is learned
from data and is often opaque even to their designers, which
makes the corner-case behaviors more unpredictable than
traditional software. Therefore, verifying security, safety, and
reliability of ML systems for different corner cases is critical
for wide deployment of ML systems.
Ideally, we want to verify an ML model by applying it on
all possible inputs including the corner-case ones and checking
that the outputs are as expected. However, it is practically in-
feasible to enumerate through all (current and future) concrete
inputs an ML model may receive. Symbolic methods [25],
[38] abstract the input space to simplify reasoning, but they
cannot scale to complex, real-world ML models. For instance,
Reluplex [25] was able to verify only deep neural nets that take
five input features and contain about three hundred neurons
whereas real-world neural nets can take thousands of input
features and contain millions of neurons.
Failing exhaustive input verification, an alternative approach
is to take an existing input, alter it, and check or enhance
the ML model on the altered input [8], [16], [23], [27], [30],
[32], [33], [37], [41], [44], [46], [51]. However, the systems
adopting this approach suffer from one or both of the following
problems. First, they assume very strong, often unrealistic,
attacker models. For instance, adversarial ML assumes that
the attacker can change arbitrary pixels of an input image to
arbitrary values [8], [16], [27], [30], [32], [33], [41], [44],
[51]. Second, they cannot provide strong guarantees about the
absence of different types of erroneous behaviors even for a
given input. For instance, none can verify that an ML model
produces correct outputs on all possible rotations (up to a
certain angle) of an image.
This paper presents a general framework that explicitly
models attacker capabilities for understanding and verifying
the security and robustness of ML systems. In our framework,
instead of changing an input arbitrarily, an attacker is con-
strained to transforming the input only via different transfor-
mation functions. Our framework thus makes it straightforward
to specify realistic attacker capabilities such as changing
brightness/contrast, rotation, smoothing/blurring, or a combi-
nation of them for vision systems. In addition, our framework
focuses on the input-output safety properties of ML systems
rather than their internal states. This design decision results
from the difference between ML and traditional systems:
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detailed specifications describing an ML system’s internal
states are hard to write even for its developers, but safety
properties involving input-output behaviors are intuitive and
easy to specify. For example, while it is extremely hard (if not
impossible) to recreate the logic of a human driver, it is easy
to envision safety properties like a self-driving cars steering
angle should not change significantly for the same road under
different lighting conditions.
We further design, implement, and evaluate VERIVIS, a
realization of this framework for computer vision systems,
an important class of ML systems. Given an input image,
VERIVIS exhaustively transforms the image via a given trans-
formation function (e.g., rotation) and generates all possible
transformed inputs, verifying that the output of ML system on
each transformed input satisfies certain safety properties. Any
violations found by VERIVIS come with concrete counter-
example inputs to help debugging. To the best of our knowl-
edge, VERIVIS represents the first methodology for verifying
a wide range of realistic safety properties (e.g., invariance of
a self-driving cars steering angle under different brightness
conditions or rotation invariance for image classifiers) on state-
of-the-art computer vision systems.
A key challenge in VERIVIS is that a transformation on
one input may still yield a practically infinite number of
transformed inputs, preventing exhaustive verification. For
instance, an image can be rotated by any rational number of
degrees. Fortunately, the key insight behind our approach is
that ML, unlike traditional software, commonly operates on
discretized inputs such as images, video, speech. For example,
a pixel’s image coordinates must be integer values bound by
the image width and height, and its RGB values also integer
values between 0 and 255. Thus, many tiny variations in
rotation degrees will still yield the same image after rounding.
Leveraging this insight, we significantly reduce the verifica-
tion search space for a diverse set of real-world image transfor-
mations such as rotation, blurring, and lightening by breaking
their parameter space into equivalent classes and verifying
the transformation result of only one representative parameter
from each class without compromising the verification guar-
antees. We show that the total number of such representative
parameters, or critical parameters, for any image (irrespective
of the contents) is polynomial (up to cubic) to the image size
for many common transformations, demonstrating scalability
with increasing input size. For instance, for a 299× 299 input
image for Inception-v3 [43] and a maximum of -2 to 2 degrees
of rotation, we need to test at most 95, 496 (as opposed to
infinitely many) different rotation degrees in the [−2, 2] range
to fully verify that the ML system satisfies certain safety
properties for the given image. While we primarily focus
on designing and evaluating VERIVIS to find violations of
safety properties in different computer vision systems but the
underlying principles are generic and can be applied to other
ML domains as well.
By focusing on input-output behaviors and making the
search space reduction process not dependent on an ML sys-
tem, VERIVIS enables an ML-model-agnostic verification ap-
proach. Specifically, given a set of inputs and transformations,
VERIVIS pre-computes the entire set of possible transformed
inputs, which can be applied to verify the presence or absence
of corner-case errors for any computer vision system on the
given input set. The main benefit over ML-model-dependent
approaches is that the verification effort primarily depends on
the type of safety property, input size, and input domain but
not on the complexity of the ML system itself.
We evaluate VERIVIS with twelve different safety prop-
erties involving real-world transformations like rotation, con-
trast, and brightness for fifteen state-of-the-art computer vision
systems: (1) six image classification DNNs trained on the im-
agenet dataset (VGG-16 [42], VGG-19 [42], MobileNet [22],
Xception [10], Inception-v3 [43] and ResNet50 [20]), which
achieved the state-of-the-art performances in ILSVRC [40]
competitions; (2) five commercial third-party vision APIs pro-
vided by Google [17], Clarifai [12], IBM [24], Microsoft [29],
and Amazon [3]; (3) four popular self-driving car models
including Rambo, one of the top performers in Udacity
self-driving car challenge, and other three are based on
Nvidia Dave self-driving systems. For all of these systems,
VERIVIS finds thousands of violations for different input
images—64.8× more than existing gradient-based methods.
For a small number of images (on average 31.7% of all
tested images), VERIVIS was to able to verify that the tested
ML systems satisfy the tested safety properties. Our results
further demonstrate that by specifically retraining on the
violated images generated by VERIVIS, the robustness of the
corresponding Ml systems can be significantly improved by
reducing up to 60.2% of the violations.
Our main contributions are:
• We define a general framework for specifying realistic
safety properties of ML systems modeling different types
of attacker capabilities.
• We present a novel decomposition and search space
reduction methodology for efficient verification different
types of safety properties for computer vision systems.
• We implement our techniques as part of VERIVIS and
use it to verify twelve safety properties on fifteen state-
of-the-art vision systems including Imagenet classifiers,
self-driving cars, and commercial vision APIs. VERIVIS
finds thousands of violations in all tested systems (see
Figure 1 for some samples).
II. A FRAMEWORK FOR VERIFYING ML ROBUSTNESS
AND SECURITY
In this section, we present a general framework for verifying
the robustness and security of ML systems against attackers
with different capabilities. First, we describe our rationale
of focusing on input-output behaviors instead of the internal
states of ML systems. Next, we present the framework for-
mally and explain its generality. Lastly, we discuss potential
implementations of this framework.
Why focus on input-output verification. Traditional and
ML programs are very different from each other in terms
of verification. Traditional programs are operational: each
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Fig. 1. Upper row shows the original inputs. Lower row shows the violations generated by different transformations for different computer vision systems as
identified by VERIVIS.
operation in the program is defined clearly by the programmers
with the intention to perform one sub-task of the overall
program task. Thus, it is conceptually feasible (albeit costly)
to (1) write a complete functional specification to ensure the
total correctness of the program and (2) specify pre- and post-
conditions for each operation to ensure the correctness of the
intermediate states.
In contrast, the logic in ML systems is learned from data
using an automated optimization process. Its logic is often
opaque even to its own designers, making it challenging to
write complete specifications. For instance, creating a com-
plete specification for the correct behavior of a self-driving
car under different driving conditions essentially involves
recreating the logic of a human driver, which is computation-
ally infeasible and not practical. In addition, the nature of
optimization means that, there are multiple acceptable ways
through different internal states for satisfying the final goal.
For instance, a car can be safely driven on the road with many
slightly different but similar steering angles. Therefore, we
conjecture that ML verification should focus on partial, input-
output correctness rather than complete functional correctness.
Input-output based safety properties are applicable to a wide
range of ML systems. For example, consider a safety prop-
erty specifying that a self-driving car’s steering angle should
remain similar for the same road under different lighting
conditions. In this setting, even though it is hard for an ML
developer to predict the safe steering angles for the self-driving
car under different scenarios, it is easy to specify such safety
properties. Similarly, a safety property for a speech recognition
system can ensure that the recognized phrases/sentences will
not change under different background noises. For a machine
translation system, the translated output should not change
significantly if the input words are substituted with other
synonyms. Malware detection systems should not change their
classifications from malware to benign due to different types of
code obfuscation/transformation techniques that do not affect
malicious functionality [53].
A formal framework for specifying ML safety properties.
An ML model can be thought of as a function f mapping
input x ∈ X to output y ∈ Y, i.e., f : X → Y. Depending
on the type of task (i.e., classification or regression), the ML
model produces either continuous or discrete output Y. For
classification tasks like object recognition, Y is a set of discrete
labels. By contrast, Y is a continuous range for regression
tasks like driving an autonomous vehicle that outputs steering
angles.
Let T (·; c) be a transformation function parameterized by
c ∈ C (C is transformation parameter space) that transforms
an input x to x′ = T (x; c). Let P be a safety property checker
that inspects a transformed input x′ for errors.
The safety properties of a ML system based on its input-
output behaviors can then be defined as follows:
Locally safe. Given a model f , an input x, a parameterized
transformation function T (·; c) where c ∈ C, and a property
checker P , f is locally safe for input x if and only if ∀c ∈ C,
P (f(T (x; c))).
Globally safe. A model f is globally safe for all inputs if
and only if ∀x ∈ X, it is locally safe. Global safety over all
inputs is in general much more challenging to achieve than
local safety on a particular input.
Our framework is expressive. The transformation function
T (·; c) and its parameter space C can be used to specify
different attacker capabilities. It can be physically realizable
transformations such as occluding a small part of an input
image, changing lighting conditions, or rotating an image. The
property checker P can check that the steering angle of a
self-driving car on x′ does not change significantly from that
on x or the car does not get into a crash. Below we give
the definitions of two safety properties that are used in our
evaluation:
Locally k-safe classification. Given a classification model
f , an input x, a parameterized transformation function T (·; c)
where c ∈ C, we define that f is k-safe with respect to T (·; c),
C, and x if and only if ∀c ∈ C, f(T (x; c), 1) ⊆ f(x, k) where
f(x, k) denotes the top-k prediction by f for x.
Locally t-safe regression. Given a regression model f , an
input x, a parameterized transformation function T (·; c) where
c ∈ C, we define that f is locally t-safe with respect to T (·; c),
3
Fig. 2. Overall verification architecture of VERIVIS.
C, and x if and only if ∀c ∈ C, |f(T (x; c))− f(x)| ≤ t.
Robustness of ML models to adversarial inputs [16] can
also be easily expressed as safety properties where the trans-
formation function T (x; c) = x + c. In this case, the
transformation parameter c is an attacker-crafted perturbation
(a tensor variable that have the same size with the input
x). The transformation parameter space includes all c such
that different types of norms of c is bounded by a user-
defined budget σ, e.g., ‖c‖0 < σ [33], ‖c‖1 < σ [53],
‖c‖2 < σ [44], or ‖c‖∞ < σ [16], [53]. The search space
of the adversarial perturbations are significantly larger than
real-world transformations like rotation, changing brightness,
etc. In this paper, we focus on verifying local safety-critical
properties involving real-world transformations [37], [41].
Potential implementations of our framework. Verifying
that an ML system satisfies a particular safety property φ is
essentially a search problem over the parameter space C of
a transformation T (·; c) (i.e., searching all possible values of
c ∈ C) for violations of the safety property. The size of the
search space for a given ML safety property varies widely
based on the property and input size/domain. For example, a
local safety property involving the image inversion operation
for image classification systems will have a search space of
only one transformed image for any given image. By contrast,
a transformation function that simulates different lighting
conditions along with different shadows for an object in a
given image will have a significantly larger search space [6],
[54]. In many cases, such large search spaces may only be
checked probabilistically for safety property violations.
The verification techniques for checking ML safety prop-
erties can use either static, symbolic, or dynamic approach.
However, existing static/symbolic techniques for traditional
software does not scale well for ML systems due to the highly
non-linear nature of the ML systems. In this paper, we focus
on dynamic and model-agnostic verification for ML systems.
However, if needed, our approach can be easily augmented
with the model knowledge to further reduce the search space.
III. METHODOLOGY
A. VERIVIS overview
In this paper, we design, implement, and evaluate VERIVIS,
an instance of the verification framework described in Sec-
tion II specifically tailored for checking different local safety
properties of computer vision systems such as self-driving cars
and image classifiers. Figure 2 shows the high-level structure
of VERIVIS. VERIVIS takes a computer vision system (e.g.,
self-driving car or image classifier) along with a local safety
property as inputs and either verifies that the computer vision
system satisfies the safety property or produces a counter-
example violating the safety property. Even though we primar-
ily focus on verifying computer vision systems in this paper,
the underlying principles are applicable to other types of ML
systems operating on discrete and bounded input domains as
well (e.g., malware detection).
VERIVIS uses blackbox dynamic analysis for verifying
safety properties of computer vision systems without knowing
its internal details. For example, VERIVIS can even verify
cloud vision APIs provided by companies like Google or
Microsoft without any information about their internals (see
Section VI for details). Specifically, VERIVIS applies different
input space reduction techniques to skip unrealizable inputs
and efficiently verify a computer vision system by only
checking for the inputs that can be feasibly generated by the
image transformation specified in the safety property. Such
input space reduction is possible because even though the
image transformation parameters are continuous (e.g., floating
point values), their output domains (e.g., the pixel values) are
discrete. Therefore, multiple different values of a transforma-
tion parameter may lead to the same image and therefore can
be safely skipped without affecting the verification guarantees.
For example, while the degree of image rotation can be a
floating point value, the pixel values of the output image are
limited and discrete (e.g., integers ranging between 0 and 255).
In general, we show that the constraints of a wide range
of realistic image transformations (e.g., rotation, changing
lighting condition) imply that the space of unique images that
can be generated by these transformations is polynomial in
the input image size for a fixed parameter range. Therefore,
VERIVIS can verify a broad spectrum of safety properties
while scaling up to the largest state-of-the-art computer vi-
sion systems. VERIVIS’s approach is conceptually similar
to explicit-state model checking [21] for traditional software
where feasible and unique states of a traditional program are
explicitly enumerated for safety property violations.
B. Reducing input spaces of image transformations
Each safety property supported by VERIVIS has a corre-
sponding parameterized image transformation associated with
the property. Similar to the transformations described in Sec-
tion II, a parameterized image transformation takes an input
image I , a parameter value c, and produces an output image
O = T (I; c). Essentially, an image transformation computes
the value of each output pixel based on the values of the input
pixels and the parameter. In theory, for an arbitrary image
transformation, each output pixel may depend on all of the
input pixels. However, in practice, an output pixel’s value
usually only depends on a small number of neighboring pixels
in the input image for most image transformations designed
to generate realistic images (e.g., rotation, changing bright-
ness/contrast, erosion). This property allows us to drastically
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reduce the search space for safety property verification. Note
that this is an inherent property of most image transformations
designed to produce realistic images as most physically real-
izable changes (i.e., changes in camera orientation, lighting
conditions, etc.) tend to satisfy this property.
Decomposition framework. Before describing the details of
the input space reduction process, we first define a generic
decomposition framework for reasoning about the space of
all distinct output images for a given parameterized image
transformation and a parameter space. Our framework relies on
the fact that most image processing operations can be decom-
posed into a multi-step pipeline of stencil operations, where
each point in the two-dimensional space is updated based on
weighted contributions from a subset of its neighbors [39]. Our
framework decomposes parameterized image transformations
into a sequence of parameterized stencil operations for efficient
search space reduction. Even though decomposition of image
processing code into stencil computations have been used to
optimize the performance of the code by Ragan-Kelley et
al. [39], to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to
reduce the output space of a parameterized image transform
using such techniques.
Specifically, we describe two pixel-specific parameterized
functions that can express the relations between the input
and output pixels of different realistic image transformations:
Dependent Pixels (ODP = DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c)) and Dependence
Function (ODF = DF(I(ODP ); c)) where I(ODP ) denotes
the pixel values of coordinates output by DP in image I . For a
given input image I and a coordinate 〈i, j〉, dependent pixels
(DP) return a list of pixel coordinates in the output image
whose values are dependent on the input pixel’s value for a
given parameter value c. Dependent function (DF) takes the
pixel values of input image I on coordinates ODP as input
and computes the value of the corresponding output pixels
based on the input pixel values for a given parameter value c.
Essentially, all possible output images for an image transfor-
mation T (I; c) of an image I of size W ×H and c ∈ Cφ can
be enumerated by evaluating Equation 1 (Cφ represents the
user-specified parameter space of a transformation for safety
property φ).
⋃
∀c∈Cφ
W−1⋃
i=0
H−1⋃
j=0
DF(I(DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c)); c) (1)
Figure 3 shows a sample decomposition of a simple one-
dimensional transformation into DP and DF . In this case,
an output pixel always depends only on three neighboring
input pixels. However, for an arbitrary image transformation,
DP , for any given input pixel, might potentially produce all
output pixels, i.e., any output pixel might be dependent on
all input pixels. Similarly, DF can also produce all possible
values (e.g., 0 to 255) for each output pixel. Therefore, in the
worst case, the number of all unique output images that can be
generated by an arbitrary transformation can be 256W×H for
a gray-scale input image with size W ×H . Even for simple
networks designed to work on small images like the MNIST
hand-written digits each with 28 × 28 pixels, the resulting
number of output images (25628×28) will be too large to
enumerate exhaustively.
However, for most realistic image transformations, DP
produces only a few dependent output pixels for each input
pixel and DF outputs only a subset of all possible output
pixel values (e.g., 0 − 255). For a wide range of real-world
transforms, we demonstrate that the number of unique output
images for a given input image and parameter range is
polynomial in the size of the image as shown in Section IV and
Table VI. VERIVIS enumerates these output images efficiently
and therefore is able to verify a wide range of safety properties
in a scalable manner.
To understand how DP and DF look for realistic image
transformations, consider a simple parameterized brightness
transformation that brightens an image by adding a constant
parameter value to all pixel values. For such a transformation,
the output pixel coordinate of DP will be same as the input
pixel coordinate as an output pixel’s value only depends on the
input pixel’s value with the same coordinate. Similarly, DF
will simply add the parameter value with the current value of
the input pixel.
Reducing the parameter space. As most the parameters
of most image transformations are continuous floating point
values, enumerating all possible parameter values in a given
parameter space is not feasible. For example, a safety property
might specify that an image can be rotated to any arbitrary an-
gle between −10◦ and 10◦. Enumerating all possible rotation
angles within the specified parameter range is too slow to be
practical.
The key insight behind our input space reduction technique
is that the output of DP and DF both are discrete, bounded
integers (e.g., DP must return valid pixel coordinates and
DF must return valid pixel values) even though the parameter
values are continuous floating point numbers. The discreteness
of the output allows us to only enumerate a small finite set
Ccritical ∈ C of critical parameter values that can cover all
possible unique output images. We formally define the critical
parameter values below.
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Definition 1. Critical parameter values in a parameter space
Cφ and transformation T in safety property φ is a mono-
tonic increasing finite sequence (ci ∈ Cφ)ni=1, i.e., ∀i ∈
{1, 2, ..., n − 1}, ci+1 > ci, where the following holds.
∀ci, ci+1 where i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1}, ∀c ∈ Cφ where ci < c <
ci+1, T (I; c) = T (I; ci) or T (I; c) = T (I; ci+1).
Definition 1 ensures that for any continuous c between two
critical parameter values, the transformation T specified in a
safety property φ will not generate a new output other than
those already generated by the immediately preceding and
following critical parameter values. For example, consider the
image translation operation where shift step is the parameter.
Translation shifts an image to the desired direction by the
desired amount. If the shift step is set to any floating point
number, the translated coordinates will be rounded (up) to
the nearest integer values. Therefore, all 〈i, j〉 pairs where
0 ≤ i ≤W − 1 and 0 ≤ j ≤ H − 1 will be critical parameter
values for the translation operation.
VERIVIS explicitly enumerates critical parameter values
Ccritical = (ci)ni=1 ignoring the continuous values that lie
between the critical parameter values. Algorithm 1 shows the
detailed procedure of finding the critical parameter values for
DP and DF for a given transformation T and parameter
space Cφ. DP−1 and DF−1 indicate inverses of DP and
DF respectively, i.e., they compute c given input and output
pixels. However, as discussed in Section III-B, more than one
values of c can often map to same ODP or ODF . Therefore,
we assume that DP−1 and DF−1 randomly samples one value
from the set of all candidates for c.
Note that the critical parameter values for more complicated
image transformations like rotation, unlike translation, may not
be equidistant from each other. We describe how DP , DF ,
DP−1 and DF−1 are computed for different transformations
in detail in Section IV.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for computing critical parameter values in param-
eter space Cφ for transformation T in property φ.
Input: Cφ
1: Ccritical ← {}
2: for all coordinates 〈i, j〉 in I do
3: for all feasible ODP ∈ DP(I, 〈i, j〉;Cφ) do
4: c = DP−1(I, 〈i, j〉;ODP )
5: if c ∈ Cφ then
6: Ccritical = Ccritical ∪ c
7: for all feasible ODF ∈ DF(I(ODP ); c) do
8: c = DF−1(I(ODP );ODF )
9: if c ∈ Cφ then
10: Ccritical = Ccritical ∪ c
11: return sorted(Ccritical)
IV. DECOMPOSITION & ANALYSIS OF REAL-WORLD
IMAGE TRANSFORMATIONS
In this section, we describe how VERIVIS supports verifi-
cation of a wide range of safety properties with different real-
world image transformations. Specifically, we describe twelve
different image transformations corresponding to twelve safety
properties (φ1, ..., φ12) summarized in Table I. These image
transformations and their compositions can simulate a wide
range of real-world distortions, noises, and deformations that
most security-critical vision systems must handle correctly.
The transformation parameters for each transformation are
shown in the third column of Table I.
These transformations can be broadly categorized into three
groups: convolutions, point transformations, and geometric
transformations. Convolution-based transformations like blur-
ring (e.g., φ1 to φ4) applies a convolution kernel on the input
image and produce the output images such that each pixel
value is determined by its local neighbors and the correspond-
ing kernel weights. By contrast, for point transformations (e.g.,
φ5 and φ6), each pixel’s new value is only decided by its
original value in the input. Finally, geometric transformations
(e.g., φ7 to φ12) shuffles the pixel values based on different
geometric constraints.
As described in Section III, VERIVIS reduces the input
space of these twelve transformations by decomposing them
into DP and DF as defined in Equation 1 and finding the
corresponding critical parameter values using Algorithm 1. We
describe the decomposition process for each transformation
in detail below. We also perform the verification complexity
analysis for each transformation and demonstrate that safety
properties related to all of these transformations can be verified
in polynomial time with respect to the input image size as
shown in Table II.
A. Convolutions
Decomposition. For all convolution-based transformations
with a kernel of size c, DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈k, l〉 : i− c/2 <
k < i+c/2 and j−c/2 < l < j+c/2} defining a square area
surrounding the pixel at 〈i, j〉. By contrast, DF will depend
on the actual operation of the transformation. For φ1, φ2,
φ3, and φ4, DF computes the average, median, minimum,
and maximum of the pixel values of the coordinates returned
by DP (ODP ), respectively.
Critical parameter values. The possible sizes of a convolu-
tion kernel (a square) for an image with width W and height H
can vary from 2×2 to S×S where S = min(W,H) because
kernel cannot be larger than the input image. As kernel sizes
have to be integers, the output of DP on each pixel 〈i, j〉 can
be 2× 2, 3× 3, ..., S × S pixels (i.e., S − 1 different values)
surrounding the input pixel. Moreover, DF for φ1 to φ4 does
not depend on the kernel size. Therefore, these convolution-
based transformations (φ1 to φ4 ) have S−1 critical parameter
values, i.e., Ccritical = {c ∈ N : 2 ≤ c ≤ min(W,H)}.
Verification complexity. As the number of different convolu-
tion kernel sizes can only be integer values and is bounded by
the image size, the number of unique output images is O(n)
where the input image size is n.
B. Point transformations
Decomposition. Point transformations (e.g., φ5 and φ6)
are simple pixel-space operations. Therefore, DP for
all these cases outputs the input coordinate itself, i.e.,
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TABLE I
A LIST OF SAFETY PROPERTIES AND CORRESPONDING
TRANSFORMATIONS THAT CAN SIMULATE A WIDE RANGE OF COMMON
REAL-WORLD IMAGE DISTORTIONS AND DEFORMATIONS.
Property Transformation Parameters Example
φ1 Average smoothing Kernel size
φ2 Median smoothing Kernel size
φ3 Erosion Kernel size
φ4 Dilation Kernel size
φ5 Contrast Gain
φ6 Brightness Bias
φ7 Occlusion Coordinate
φ8 Rotation Rotation angle
φ9 Shear Proportion
φ10 Scale Scalar
φ11 Translation Shift step
φ12 Reflection Direction
TABLE II
VERIFICATION COMPLEXITY OF DIFFERENT TRANSFORMATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO THE INPUT IMAGE SIZE n = W ×H .
Transformation Verif.Complexity Transformation
Verif.
Complexity
Avg. smoothing O(n) Med. smoothing O(n)
Erosion O(n) Dilation O(n)
Contrast O(1) Brightness O(1)
Occlusion O(n) Rotation O(n2)
Shear O(n3) Scale O(n2)
Translation O(n) Reflection O(1)
DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈i, j〉}. Essentially, DP is an identity
function for these transformations. By contrast, DF de-
pends on the functionality of each transformation. For φ5,
DF(I(〈i, j〉); c) = c · I(〈i, j〉), where c is the gain used to
adjust the contrast of the input image [1]. Similarly, for φ6,
DF(I(〈i, j〉); c) = c + I(〈i, j〉), where c is the bias used to
adjust the brightness of the input image [45].
Critical parameter values. As noted above, DP for both
φ5 and φ6 is an identity function and is independent of
c. Therefore, DP does not affect the number of critical
parameters.
For φ5, DF change the image contrast by multiplying c
to each pixel value. Therefore, PF is a function mapping any
pixel value in [0, 255] to a new value in [0, 255] by multiplying
c. It is easy to see that at most |Ccritical| = 256 × 256
critical parameter values are enough to cover all such unique
mappings. Specifically, Ccritical ≤
255⋃
m=0
255⋃
n=0
m
n where critical
parameter values resulting in invalid (e.g., division by zero)
or duplicate values can be further reduced.
Similarly, DF for φ6 is a function mapping any pixel value
in [0, 255] to [0, 255] by adding c. Therefore Ccritical for φ6
is {−255,−254, ..., 254, 255}.
Verification complexity. As shown in the earlier analysis, the
number of critical parameter values for φ5 and φ6 does not
depend on the input image size n. Therefore, the total number
of critical parameter values Ccritical has O(1) complexity with
respect to the image size.
C. Geometric transformations
Decomposition. In this paper, we analyze five types of ge-
ometric transformations —occlusion with a predefined mask
image (φ7), rotation (φ8), shear (φ9), scale (φ10), translation
(φ11), and reflection (φ12). For all of these transformations,
DP maps one coordinate to another within the image, i.e.,
DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈i′, j′〉}, and DF is an identity function,
i.e., DF(I, 〈i′, j′〉; c) = I(〈i′, j′〉). We describe the individual
DP function for each transformation below.
For occlusion (φ7), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈i, j〉} if i /∈
[cW , cW + WOcclMask] and j /∈ [cH , cH + HOcclMask]. If
a pixel’s coordinates are within this range, its value is decided
by the occlusion mask and is independent of any pixel value
in the input image. Here, (cW , cH) denotes the coordinate of
the upper-left corner of the image where the occlusion mask
is applied and WOcclMask and HOcclMask denote the widths
and heights of the occlusion mask respectively.
For rotation (φ8), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈i · cos c− j · sin c, i ·
sin c+ j · cos c〉} where c is the rotation degree. Note that we
only consider rotation around the center of the image here but
DP for rotation around arbitrary points can also be constructed
in the same manner.
Similarly, for shear (φ9), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = {〈i +
jcW , icH + j〉}, where c = (cW , cH) are the horizontal and
vertical shear parameters.
For scale (φ10), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = 〈icW , jcH〉, where c =
(cW , cH) are the horizontal and vertical scale parameters.
For translation (φ11), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = 〈i + cW , j + cH〉,
where c = (cW , cH) are the horizontal and vertical shifting
parameters.
Finally, for reflection (φ12), DP(I, 〈i, j〉; c) = 〈icW , jcH〉,
where c = (cW , cH) ∈ {(−1, 1), (1,−1), (−1,−1)}, repre-
sent three types of reflections (horizontal, vertical, and central).
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Fig. 4. Illustration of how rotation shuffles the coordinates around for a 3×3
image. Black dots represent the coordinate of each pixel. The circle shows
the trajectory of coordinate 〈i, j〉 during rotation with different angles. Any
intersection of the circular trajectory with a dotted line (right at the middle
between horizontal and vertical coordinates) will be rounded to the nearest
coordinate. For a new rounded coordinate 〈i′, j′〉, the formula for calculating
the corresponding critical rotation angle is shown on the right.
Critical parameter values. As the size and content of the
occlusion mask for φ7 are fixed, the number of different
outputs of DP depend on where the occlusion mask is applied
as decided by c = (cW , cH). Therefore, Ccritical = {〈i, j〉 :
i ∈ [0,W−WOcclMask], j ∈ [H−HOcclMask]}, which are all
possible coordinates where OcclMask can be applied. As the
coordinates have to be integers, the number of critical param-
eter values is (W −WOcclMask+1)× (H −HOcclMask+1).
We describe the computation of the critical parameter values
for φ8, the most complex one among φ8 to φ12, in detail below
and skip the details for the other transformations (φ9-φ12) as
they are similar to φ8.
Figure 4 shows the movement of the coordinates (along the
circle) while rotating an image around the center of the image.
Consider the coordinate 〈1, 0〉, (e.g., 〈i, j〉 in Figure 4) is
being rotated, DP will only output new coordinates when the
circular trajectory intersects with the dotted lines (e.g., vertical
x = {...,−0.5, 0.5, ...} or horizontal y = {...,−0.5, 0.5, ...}).
Before intersecting with the next dotted line, all the rotated
coordinates that correspond to the parts of the trajectory
between any two adjacent dotted lines with arrows will always
be rounded to the same coordinate. In Figure 4, 〈i′, j′〉 =
〈√3/2, 1/2〉 will be rounded (up) to 〈1, 1〉. Thus, DP can only
output seven new coordinates in Figure 4. Therefore, given
any 〈i, j〉, we compute how many dotted lines intersect with
the corresponding trajectory. We calculate the rotation degree
(c) for each intersecting coordinate 〈i′, j′〉 using the following
equation.
c = arccos
ij + i′j′√
i2 + j2
√
i′2 + j′2
Finally, we compute the union of all possible rotation
degrees of each coordinate that can be mapped to a new one
by DP following Algorithm 1, where the resulting union is
the final critical parameter values for rotation (Ccritical).
Verification complexity. The occlusion mask can only be ap-
plied on integer coordinates within the input image. Therefore,
as described above, the number of critical parameter values for
φ7 is (W−WOcclMask+1)×(H−HOcclMask+1). Therefore,
the verification complexity is O(n).
As shown in Figure 4, for φ8, each trajectory of a coordinate
can only be changed to at most (w− 1)× (h− 1) number of
new coordinates. As the input has w × h number of distinct
coordinates, the number of possible changes is O(w2 · h2) =
O(n2).
For φ9, DP outputs 〈i+jcW , icH+j〉 for each 〈i, j〉. Note
that i+ jcW can have at most w ·h ·w number of valid values
(w possible values for i, h for j, and w for i + jcW ). The
same analysis applies to possible values of icH + j as well,
i.e., the number of valid values is w · h · h. In total, there are
w3 · h3 = O(n3) total possible pairs of (cW , cH).
For φ10, DP outputs 〈icW , jcH〉 for input 〈i, j〉. For a given
i and j, icW can have w distinct values of icW and jch can
also have h distinct values. Since there is w ∗ h numbers of
possible 〈i, j〉 pairs, the verification complexity will be w2 ·
h2 = O(n2).
For φ11, the transformation can only shift the image within
the original image size and all the critical parameter values
must be integers. Therefore, φ11 has O(n) verification com-
plexity.
Finally, φ12 is a special case where there are only three
types of reflection operations. Thus, φ12 has O(1) verification
complexity.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation of VERIVIS consists of 4,465 lines
of Python code. VERIVIS uses OpenCV, the popular image
processing and vision library, to implement efficient image
transformations. All of our experiments are run on a Linux
laptop with Ubuntu 16.04 (one Intel i7-6700HQ 2.60 GHz
processor with 4 cores, 16 GB memory, and a NVIDIA
GTX 1070 GPU). To significantly cut down verification time,
we also implemented batch prediction [9], using both GPU
and CPU, to make the target computer vision system predict
multiple images in parallel.
We evaluate VERIVIS with 12 different safety properties
with different transformations. We use VERIVIS to verify 15
total vision systems including 10 popular pre-trained DNNs
performing tasks like object recognition, autonomous driving,
etc., and 5 third-party blackbox image recognition services
using API access. Table III shows a summary of all 15
computer vision systems and the corresponding datasets used
for verification in our experiments. These systems can be
categorized into three groups based on the tasks they perform
and the type of access they provide (e.g., API access vs. the
trained model). We describe them in detail below.
1000-class ImageNet classification. This group of vision sys-
tems use DNNs trained using the ImageNet [15] dataset. All
of these DNNs achieved state-of-the-art image classification
performance in ILSVRC [40] competitions. Specifically, we
verify the following six pre-trained DNNs: VGG-16 [42],
VGG-19 [42], MobileNet [22], Xception [10], Inception-
v3 [43] and ResNet50 [20]. All these DNNs are consid-
ered major breakthroughs in DNN architectures as they im-
proved the state-of-the-art performances during each year of
ILSVRC [40] competitions. We also use test images from the
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TABLE III
DETAILS OF THE COMPUTER VISION SYSTEMS AND THE CORRESPONDING DATASETS USED FOR EVALUATING VERIVIS.
Task description Test dataset ID Underlyingarchitecture
Input
size∗
Top-5
loss
Top-1
loss
Pred. time
(ms/img)
Detect ILSVRC
1000 class labels
ImageNet [15]
provided in
ILSVRC [40]
IMG C1 VGG-16 [42] 224×224 0.1 0.295 102.9
IMG C2 VGG-19 [42] 224×224 0.09 0.273 103.9
IMG C3 MobileNet [22] 224×224 0.105 0.293 45.3
IMG C4 Xception [10] 299×299 0.055 0.21 54
IMG C5 Inception-v3 [43] 299×299 0.059 0.218 87.9
IMG C6 ResNet-50 [20] 224×224 0.071 0.242 50.8
Detect categories
of general images
ImageNet [15]
provided in
ILSVRC [40]
API C1 Google Vision [17] 224×224 -∗∗ -∗∗ 904.87
API C2 Clarifai Tagging [12] 224×224 -∗∗ -∗∗ 957.98
API C3 IBM Vision [24] 224×224 -∗∗ -∗∗ 689.14
API C4 Microsoft Vision [29] 224×224 -∗∗ -∗∗ 496.68
API C5 Amazon Rekognition [3] 224×224 -∗∗ -∗∗ 795.91
Predict steering angle
for each frame
captured from car’s
front scene
Driving images
provided by
Udacity autonomous
car challenge [47]
DRV C1 Rambo [14] 192×256 0.058+ 0.058+ 33.6
DRV C2 Dave-orig [4], [7] 100×100 0.091+ 0.091+ 31.6
DRV C3 Dave-norminit [49] 100×100 0.053+ 0.053+ 31.1
DRV C4 Dave-dropout [13] 100×100 0.084+ 0.084+ 31.1
∗ We specify only image width and height for one channel. Color images have 3 channels with same height and width.
∗∗ The third-party blackbox APIs do not disclose their performance on any public test dataset.
+ We use MSE to measure the performance of self-driving car DNNs. Therefore, top-5 and top-1 loss have the same value for those DNNs.
TABLE IV
AVERAGE NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS FOUND BY VERIVIS FOR EACH TEST INPUT IN DIFFERENT STATE-OF-THE-ART IMAGENET CLASSIFIERS AND
SELF-DRIVING SYSTEMS. THE RESULTS ARE AVERAGES OVER 10 INPUT IMAGES FOR EACH SAFETY PROPERTY.
φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 φ9 φ10 φ11 φ12
IMG C1 5 2.7 1.3 2 5359.1 39.4 4635.4 8782.8 710.5 20863 56.2 1.3
IMG C2 2.5 2 2.5 1.4 3496.2 42.3 1657.2 25307.7 61592.9 2455.8 49.7 1.2
IMG C3 3.7 1.8 2 2.8 5207.6 23.2 3960.5 11459.3 10.1 1239.7 61 1.4
IMG C4 1.7 2 2.3 1.8 3218.7 21.6 5253.5 10603.8 63613.5 13684 197 1.5
IMG C5 4 1.5 1.8 1.4 6724.5 39 1805 45642.8 724 368.5 40 1.6
IMG C6 6 2.1 1.7 1.7 8596 43 1699 9757.8 6224 47312 19 2.1
DRV C1 3.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 11935.9 89.7 65.4 7818.5 5561.2 4286.1 23.6 N/A*
DRV C2 2.4 0.7 2 2.4 11294.2 35.6 2530.5 1207 51.4 303.5 108.8 N/A*
DRV C3 1.6 1.8 2.3 3.6 18452.1 79 539.5 1722.2 258.1 783.3 42.6 N/A*
DRV C4 1.1 2.5 1.6 1.9 5768.6 56.1 1866.8 372.8 504.6 7.6 123.3 N/A*
*Safety property involving reflected images is not realistic for self-driving cars.
test set provided by ILSVRC for verifying the local safety
properties.
Third-party image classification services. We also evaluate
VERIVIS on five blackbox commercial image classification
APIs provided by Google [17], Clarifai [12], IBM [24],
Microsoft [29], and Amazon [3]. We use the same test images
from ILSVRC as discussed above.
Self-driving cars. For verifying computer vision systems
performing regression tasks, we use four self-driving car
DNNs that control the steering angle based on the input
images captured by a front camera. In particular, we adopt
Rambo [14], which is one of the top-ranked models in the
Udacity self-driving car challenge [47], and three other open-
source implementations [4], [13], [49] based on the Nvidia’s
Dave-2 self-driving system [7]. We use the testing set from the
Udacity challenge [48] for verifying local safety properties.
VI. EVALUATION
A. Results
Summary. VERIVIS found thousands of violations of different
tested safety properties in all of the tested vision systems.
Table IV and V summarize the number of violations that
VERIVIS found for imagenet classifiers, self-driving cars, and
third-party image classification services. Table X and XI in
Appendix A) show some of sample inputs found by VERIVIS
that violates safety properties of these vision systems.
Due to high network latency and cost ($0.001 per query), for
third-party image classification services, we only verify with
relative properties with small number of critical parameters
and report the result in Table V. Note that each number is
averaged from the results from 10 random seed images. For
t- and k-safety properties, as described in Section II, we set
t = 0.1 and k = 1 for these experiments. Table VI shows
the parameter spaces (Cφ) that we use for generating these
violations.
Verified images with no violations. We found that the number
of verified input images, i.e., images for which a computer
vision system do not violate a given safety property, varies
widely based on the verification complexity of the safety
property. The number of verified images decrease with higher
verification complexity. However, even for properties with low
verification complexity, we find that the number of verified
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TABLE V
AVERAGE NUMBER OF VIOLATIONS FOUND BY VERIVIS FOR EACH TEST
INPUT IN THE THIRD-PARTY IMAGE RECOGNITION APIS. THE RESULTS
ARE AVERAGED OVER 10 IMAGES FOR EACH PROPERTY. DUE TO HIGH
NETWORK LATENCY AND COST, WE ONLY TESTED FOR PROPERTIES WITH
RELATIVELY LOW VERIFICATION COMPLEXITY.
φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ6 φ7 φ12
API C1 3.1 3.1 2.6 1.8 81.9 187.8 1.5
API C2 6 2.8 1.5 1.5 25.4 105.4 1
API C3 5.6 2.1 2.8 2.3 44 164.9 2.4
API C4 0.5 1.8 2 2 100.5 75.6 2.2
API C5 3.5 1.6 1.7 2.2 52.5 187 0.9
TABLE VI
THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CRITICAL PARAMETER VALUES FOR
DIFFERENT INPUT SIZES FOR EACH SAFETY PROPERTY φ AND THE
CORRESPONDING PARAMETER SPACE TESTED WITH VERIVIS.
Property Cφ
Max |Ccritical| for each input size
224 299 192×256 100
φ1 [2, 10] 9 9 9 9
φ2 [2, 10] 4? 4? 4? 4?
φ3 [2, 5] 4 4 4 4
φ4 [2, 5] 4 4 4 4
φ5 [0.5, 2] 32512 32512 32512 32512
φ6 [-100, 100] 200 200 200 200
φ7 -† 33856 67081 40592 6400
φ8 [-2, 2] 95496 225552 106722 8370
φ9 [-0.01, 0.01] 250000 810000 238824 5140
φ10 [0.99, 1.01] 244036 788544 230580 10000
φ11 [-10, 10] 400 400 400 400
φ12 -‡ 3 3 3 3
? OpenCV only supports odd box sizes and thus smaller Cφ than φ1.
† Position of occlusion mask is bounded by the image size.
‡ Reflection has only three critical parameter values.
TABLE VII
THE NUMBER AND PERCENTAGE OF VERIFIED IMAGES WITH RESPECT TO
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF IMAGES IN ILSVRC TEST SET FOR SAFETY
PROPERTIES φ2 , φ3 , φ4 , AND φ12 FOR IMG C3 (MOBILENET). THE LAST
COLUMN SHOWS THE ORIGINAL ACCURACY OF IMG C3 ON THIS TEST
SET.
Property # Verified inputs Original accuracy
φ2 28,509 28.5% 70.7%
φ3 34,644 34.6% 70.7%
φ4 30,979 31% 70.7%
φ12 32,817 32.8% 70.7%
images is very low (on average 31.7%).
Table VII reports the number of verified images for proper-
ties φ2 (median smooth), φ3 (erosion), φ4 (dilation), and φ12
(reflection) for IMG C3 on all test images (100, 000) from
ILSVRC [40]. As shown in Table VII, the original top-1 test
accuracy of IMG C3 is around 70.7% which is significantly
higher than the percentage of verified inputs.
Comparison of VERIVIS with gradient-based methods.
Adversarial ML inputs, gradient-based approaches for finding
violations of based on stochastic gradient descent is one
of the most widely-used techniques in prior works to find
violations to given ML systems [16], [33]. These gradient-
based approaches do not provide any guarantee about absence
of erroneous inputs. However, in order to empirically estimate
how many erroneous cases they miss, we compare VERIVIS
with gradient-based approaches in terms of number of vio-
lations found by both of these techniques. Specifically, we
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Fig. 5. Comparison of average numbers of violations found by gradient-based
methods and VERIVIS for property φ6 (changing brightness). VERIVIS finds
64.8× more violations than gradient based approach.
leverage the projected gradient descent approach described by
Pei et al. [37] to change the brightness of an image (φ6) and
compare the number of violations found against those found
by VERIVIS. We use the same values of the parameter space
(Cφ), k, and t as described in Section VI-A.
Figure 5 shows that VERIVIS finds up to 64.8 times more
violations than the gradient-based approach. This demonstrates
that gradient-based approaches often miss a large number of
safety violations in computer vision systems.
Effects of k and t on the number of violations. We present
how the thresholds k and t of local safety properties defined
in Section II influence the number of violations found by
VERIVIS. As shown in Figure 6, the number of violations
decreases with increases in k and t. This is intuitive as
increasing k and t essentially increase the allowed margin
of error for the vision systems. One interesting fact is that
although the number of violations drops significantly when k
increases from 1 to 2, the changes in number of violations
tend to be smaller when k increases further. By contrast, the
decrease in the number of violations for different increasing
values of t seems to be more uniform.
Violations for composition of transformations. We also
explore the efficacy of VERIVIS to verify safety properties
involving composition of multiple transformation (e.g., φ1 and
φ6). For such cases, VERIVIS computes Ccritical for the new
composite transformation by calculating the Cartesian product
of the critical parameter values of each of the individual
transformations. Specifically, we run VERIVIS for different
compositions of φ1 (average smoothing), φ6 (lighting), and
φ11 (translation).
Figure 7 shows the results averaged for ten random input
images with IMG C3 as the verification target. We find that
the number of violations for composite transformations is
larger than simply multiplying the number of violations for
individual transformations. This indicates that the composition
of different transformations result in new violations than
combinations of the existing ones for each individual transfor-
mation. Therefore, verifying safety properties with composite
transformations, besides individual transformations, is critical
for safety- and security-critical vision systems.
Distribution of violating parameter values. We also inves-
tigate how the violating parameter values are distributed in
the parameter space. For example, we check whether the gain
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Fig. 6. The change in the average number of violations of different safety properties as we increase k (upper two rows) and t (lower two rows) as defined in
Section II. The number are averages over 10 images. The number of violations tend to decrease with increasing k or t. The number above each bar shows
the actual number of violations found for each k or t in IMG C3 and DRV C2 respectively.
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Fig. 7. Average number of violations found for properties φ1, φ6, and φ11
and their different compositions. We use IMG C3 (MobileNet) as the target
for verification.
values for brightness transformation causing safety property
violations follow some obvious patterns. Our results indicate
that while some violating parameter values for transformations
like average smoothing follow simple patterns (e.g., parameter
values that are higher than a threshold cause violations), most
of the transformations do not display any obvious patterns.
Figure 8 presents the results for IMG C3 (MobileNet)
and two different transformations: average smoothing (φ1)
and changing brightness (φ6) with the same experimental
setting as those described in Section VI-A. We pick these two
transformations as their parameter space in one-dimensional
and relatively small enough for clear demonstration in a two-
dimensional graph. Figure 8 shows that, for φ1, when the
kernel size exceeds a threshold (i.e., 6) for a specific input,
the smoothing tends to always induce violations. However,
by contrast, we do not find any obvious pattern among the
brightness parameter values for φ6 that result in violations.
Effect of increasing parameter space Cφ on violations. We
show the number of violations found by VERIVIS as the range
of transformation space increases using Dave-orig (DRV C2)
as the target vision system. Figure 9 shows that the number of
violations increases as we increase the range due to increase
in the number of critical parameter values that need to be
checked. For example, the average number of violations for
rotation (φ8) increases from 1360.5 to 3573.1 when we change
the range of rotation degrees from [−2, 2] to [−3, 3].
Violations for complex transformations. Several real-world
phenomena (e.g., fog, rain, etc.) that may affect input im-
ages are hard to replicate using the simple transformations
described in the paper. However, one design custom trans-
formations to mimic such effects and use VERIVIS to check
safety properties with these transformations. As an example of
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Fig. 8. Distribution of the violations with increasing transformation parameter
values for average smoothing (φ1) and lighting effect (φ6). “Yes” and “No”
indicate the image transformed by this particular parameter violates and satisfy
the safety property, respectively.
this approch, we demonstrate how a simple parameterized fog-
simulating transformation can be designed and verified with
VERIVIS. For this transformation, we start with a fog mask,
apply average smoothing on the mask, and apply the mask to
the input image. By controlling the smoothing kernel size, we
simulate different amounts of fog.
We use VERIVIS to enumerate and check all critical param-
eter values for the fog transform described above, i.e., different
box sizes for average smoothing. VERIVIS were able to find
hundreds of violations in MobileNet (IMG C3), Google vision
API (API C1), and dave-orig (DRV C2). Figure 9 shows three
sample violations found by VERIVIS.
B. Performance
In this section, we evaluate the performances of VERIVIS in
terms of the time it takes to verify different safety properties.
We report the numbers for VGG-19 (IMG C2) and Rambo
(DRV C1) as they have the slowest inference time and there-
fore illustrate the worst case behavior of VERIVIS. All the test
settings are the same as the ones described in Section VI-A
and Table VI unless mentioned otherwise.
Summary. Table VIII shows the overall verification time
required to verify each property for VGG-19 (IMG C2) and
Rambo (DRV C1) after adopting batch prediction. The total
verification time of enumerating all possible critical parameter
values per image varies from 0.3 to 1863.5 seconds.
TABLE VIII
THE AVERAGE VERIFICATION TIME (IN SECONDS) FOR VERIFYING
DIFFERENT PROPERTIES FOR IMG C2 AND DRV C1.
φ1 φ2 φ3 φ4 φ5 φ6 φ7 φ8 φ9 φ10 φ11 φ12
IMG C2 1.4 1.1 1.1 1.1 225.3 5 238.4 714.5 1863.5 1798.9 8.6 1.1
DRV C1 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 75.1 1.6 81.2 242.1 596.6 596.1 3 0.7
We find that the verification time primarily depends on the
number of critical parameter values for a transformation as the
image transformation operation is significantly cheaper than
the testing time for each transformed image. For example,
verification φ1 (9 critical parameter values) takes only 0.3
seconds but φ5 (32,512 critical parameter values) takes around
75.1 seconds for DRV C1 as shown in Table VIII.
Performance improvement with batch prediction. As de-
scribed in Section V, VERIVIS uses batch prediction [9],
using both GPU and CPU, to speed up the verification process
by allowing vision systems to predict a batch of images
in parallel. Table III shows batch prediction can speed up
verification by upto 17.6× times for VGG-19 (IMG C2), and
197.6× times for Rambo (DRV C1).
TABLE IX
THE AVERAGE RUNNING TIME (MILLISECOND PER IMAGE) OF VERIVIS
WITH AND WITHOUT BATCH PREDICTION ON THE VGG-19 (IMG C2)
AND RAMBO (DRV C1). THE SPEEDUP IS SHOWN IN THE LAST COLUMN.
Baseline Batch pred. Speed-up
IMG C2 103.9 5.9 17.6×
DRV C1 33.6 0.17 197.6×
C. Improving robustness with retraining
In this subsection, we investigate whether the robustness of
the tested computer vision systems against these transforma-
tions can be improved by retraining the affected systems using
the violations found by VERIVIS. In particular, we borrow the
idea of adversarial retraining as a data augmentation technique
introduced by Goodfellow et al. [16] to retrain the ML models
on transformed images that induce safety violations. We pick
VGG-16 for this experiment due to its large number of safety
violations (the largest Top-1 loss as shown in Table III).
We compare the violations found by VERIVIS for the
retrained models and the original ones using ten randomly
selected images from the ILSVRC test set. We use two
different training data augmentation strategies: (1) retraining
on the safety-violating images generated from the test images
and (2) retraining on the safety-violating images generated
from different images than the test images. Note that the
the second approach is less likely to overfit than the first
approach. Figure 11 shows the number of violations found for
randomly-drawn 10 testing images before and after retraining
the VGG-16 with our two tactics. The results show that both
approaches of retraining described above reduce the number
of violations and therefore improve the robustness of the
ML model. Overall, such retraining reduced the number of
violations up to 60.2% on average for different images.
VII. RELATED WORK
Testing and verification of machine learning. Given the
deployment of ML systems in security- and safety-critical
settings, some recent studies have focused on generating
diverse and realistic corner-case test inputs for testing ML
systems and have found numerous incorrect behavior in state-
of-the-art systems [37], [46]. However, none of these systems,
unlike VERIVIS, can provide any guarantee about the non-
existence of safety violations.
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Fig. 9. The average numbers of violations found increase as we increase the range of the parameter space (Cφ). The number above each bar shows the exact
number of violations with the corresponding bounds.
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Fig. 10. Violations found by VERIVIS for a fog-simulating transforma-
tion in MobileNet (IMG C3), Google vision API (API C1), and dave-orig
(DRV C2). The first and second rows show the original images and the foggy
images that result in violations, respectively.
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Even in the latter case, the number of violations can drop by up to 60%.
Several researchers have also explored whitebox formal
verification techniques for DNNs to ensure correct behavior
under different settings [23], [25], [38]. Unlike VERIVIS, these
techniques either fail to provide strong guarantees or does not
scale to real-world-sized ML systems (e.g., neural network
with thousands of neurons) [23], [25], [38].
Adversarial machine learning. Adversarial machine learning
is a popular research area that focuses on generating error-
inducing test inputs for ML models by adding minimal per-
turbations to an existing input [16], [26], [27], [30], [35], [41],
[44], [51], [53] and studying how to improve the robustness
of the ML systems against such attacks [5], [8], [11], [18],
[23], [28], [36], [50], [55]. We refer the interested readers to
the survey by Papernot et al. [34] for more details on these
works.
The key difference between VERIVIS and this line of work
is twofold: (1) Adversarial inputs only focus on checking one
type of safety property by adding adversarial perturbations.
By contrast, VERIVIS is a general verification framework that
supports a broad set of safety properties with more realistic
transformations that even weak attackers might be able to
induce; and (2) Unlike any of the adversarial machine learning
projects, VERIVIS can ensure non-existence of inputs that
violate a given safety property for state-of-the-art ML systems.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a general framework for verify-
ing the robustness of ML systems with different real-world
safety properties that can model different attacker capabil-
ities. We designed, implemented, and extensively evaluated
VERIVIS, a scalable verification system that can verify a
diverse set of safety properties for state-of-the-art computer
vision systems with only blackbox access. VERIVIS leveraged
a generic decomposition framework for image transformations
to significantly reduce the search space of different safety
properties for efficient verification.
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TABLE X
SAMPLE VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY PROPERTIES FOUND BY VERIVIS IN DIFFERENT VISION SYSTEMS TRAINED ON IMAGENET.
Model ID Original Transformed Violated
Image Labels (Top-5) Image Label (Top-1)
IMG C1
pomegranate
bell pepper
acorn squash
pizza
trifle
starfish φ6
IMG C2
park bench
sundial
cannon
bannister
plow
peacock φ7
IMG C3
stage
cornet
trombone
cello
violin
bathtub
jellyfish φ8
IMG C4
sea snake
scuba diver
sea lion
coral reef
brain coral
wreck φ9
IMG C5
cassette player
tape player
radio
CD player
loudspeaker
Polaroid camera φ11
IMG C6
Eskimo dog
Siberian husky
malamute
Norwegian elkhoun
Pembroke
Cardigan φ5
API C1
spider
arachnid
invertebrate
tangle web spider
arthropod
water φ3
API C2
scissors
equipment
tool
steel
work
business φ1
API C3
carthorse
odd-toed ungulate
mammal
animal
buggy
elk φ12
API C4
tree
outdoor
animal
mammal
ape
fungus φ2
API C5
Belt
Carousel
Indoors
Lobby
Reception
architecture φ4
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TABLE XI
SAMPLE VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY PROPERTIES FOUND BY VERIVIS IN DIFFERENT SELF-DRIVING SYSTEMS.
Model ID Original Transformed Violated
Image Steering angle prediction Image Steering angle prediction
DRV C1 near straight (left 0.1◦) turn right (right 25◦) φ6
DRV C2 near straight (right 4◦) turn right (right 44◦) φ7
DRV C3 near straight (left 3.7◦) turn right (right 27◦) φ11
DRV C4 near straight (left 0.03◦) turn right (right 38◦) φ2
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